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Abstract
A central assumption that underpins much of the discussion of the role played by social cognition in brain evolution is that
social cognition is unusually cognitively demanding. This assumption has never been tested. Here, we use a task in which
participants read stories and then answered questions about the stories in a behavioural experiment (39 participants) and
an fMRI experiment (17 participants) to show that mentalising requires more time for responses than factual memory of a
matched complexity and also that higher orders of mentalising are disproportionately more demanding and require the
recruitment of more neurons in brain regions known to be associated with theory of mind, including insula, posterior STS,
temporal pole and cerebellum. These results have significant implications both for models of brain function and for models
of brain evolution.
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Introduction
Mentalising, also known as mindreading or theory of mind, is
the ability to infer the mental states of another individual and
to recognise that these mental states can affect their behaviour
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). It is a trait that appears to be all
but unique to humans (Saxe, 2006; Tomasello and Call, 1998).
Formally, mentalising involves the recursive understanding of
mental states (I think that you suppose that I intend that you believe
that something is the case . . .) and the number of separate mind
states involved is defined as the order of intentionality (in this
example, fourth order intentionality) (Dennett, 1983). While
children begin to engage with others’ mindstates as early as
12-18 months of age (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Kovacs et al., 2010),
formal theory of mind (i.e. when they understand the mind
states of another person sufficiently well to recognise a false be-
lief—equated with second order intentionality: I believe that you
think that something is the case [even when I know this isn’t true])—
probably does not finally consolidate until around 4–5 years of
age (Perner, 1991). Most research over the past two decades or
so has focussed on formal theory of mind, i.e. second order in-
tentionality, largely because this is a major developmental mile-
stone for young children. However, as children develop, they
are able to cope with progressively higher orders of mentalising
(Henzi et al., 2007), and are able to handle the mind states of sev-
eral individuals at the same time (I think that Peter believes that
Susan wants Elizabeth to suppose [something]). In normal adults,
this capacity reaches an asymptotic limit at around fifth order
intentionality, with only small numbers of individuals able to
perform successfully at higher orders (Kinderman et al., 1998;
Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Powell et al., 2010).
Although Roth and Leslie’s assertion (1998) that we have
very little idea as to what, in cognitive terms, theory of mind
and its associated higher orders actually is remains largely un-
challenged, two key claims have been made about it: first, that
this form of social cognition is computationally demanding
(Dunbar, 1998; Lin et al., 2010) and, second, that the ability to
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engage in the higher orders of intentionality may be dependent
on the capacity to recruit a more extended neural network
(Barrett et al., 2003; Dunbar, 2010). Several studies have used re-
action time paradigms to demonstrate that introspection is ef-
fortful (Corallo et al., 2008). However, the question of whether
mentalising is any more demanding than the more conven-
tional concatenation of a set of facts remains unclear. While
two recent studies (one using memory for friends’ traits as a ‘so-
cial working memory’ task (Meyer et al., 2012), the other using
eye gaze in an implicit false belief task: Schneider et al., 2012)
provide prima facie evidence for an effect of cognitive load, men-
talising itself has yet to be examined.
Functional MRI has revealed a pattern of activation within
certain regions of the brain that has been interpreted as a neural
network for theory of mind reasoning. These include the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), temporal pole (TP), and medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [20-24], as well as anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), superior temporal
gyrus (STG), precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex and amygdala
(Gallagher et al., 2002; Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith,
2003; Fukui et al., 2006; Kobayashi et al., 2006; Vollm et al., 2006;
Saxe and Powell, 2006; van Overwalle, 2009; Carrington and
Bailey, 2009; Lewis et al., 2011). These studies do not, however,
consider the pattern of activation as a function of the complex-
ity (or level) of mentalising, but rather focus exclusively on the-
ory of mind reasoning (i.e. second order intentionality).
Here, we first use a reaction time task to test the hypotheses
(1) that mentalising (memory for mental states) is cognitively
more demanding than simple memory for facts (with no men-
talising component), and (2) that this difference is amplified at
higher orders of task difficulty. We then use functional MRI
(fMRI) to show that this involves a parallel increase in neural ac-
tivation as the intentionality order of the task increases. In both
studies, the factual tasks function as the baseline for determin-
ing the added effect due to mentalising. Both mentalising and
factual tasks require short term memory for their successful
completion, and the question we ask is whether or not adding a
mentalising component to factual tasks increases the cognitive
work that has to be done to answer them correctly.
Materials and methods
To examine the impact of increasingly complex mentalising on
both response times and neural activity, we used a vignette-
plus-questions study design (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007; Lewis
et al., 2011) in which subjects read a short story describing a so-
cial event and then answer a series of true/false questions at
varying levels of intentionality, with control questions which
required equivalent factual memory processing but contained
no mentalising component. In both experiments, subjects read
a series of short stories about different social situations that
involved two or more individuals (for example, a man taking his
wife out to dinner for their anniversary). The characters within
the stories have different points of view about their fellow char-
acters and the situation. The stories also contain facts about the
social situation and the characters themselves. The stories pre-
sented were those used by Lewis et al. (2011), with a sixth newly
written for Experiment 1. All of the stories were approximately
200 words long (mean length¼ 1976 12.6 se words). After read-
ing each story, participants were presented with a series of
statements relating to it, each of which could be true or false.
Ten of these statements involved mentalising (two each at in-
tentionality levels 2–6) and 10 were purely factual (with content
and length matched, as well as the number of factual
propositions involved) (with level 1 in each case representing
the subject’s own state of mind: the subject believes that . . . .).
Mentalising questions did not differ significantly from factual
questions in the number of words or propositions they con-
tained (on average, mentalising and factual questions differed
by no more than 0.5 words at any given level: t-tests, all
levels NS). A sample story with questions is given in the
Supplementary Data.
Stimuli were presented using Cogent v.2000 run through
Matlab 6.5 software platform. Subjects were instructed to an-
swer each question using a keyboard (with keys for ‘true’, ‘false’
and ‘don’t know’) as soon as possible after the question was
presented, and that the next question would not be presented
until they had done so. The ‘don’t know’ response option was
included in order to minimise the incidence of guessing in the
other options, thus ensuring a cleaner sample of trials for fMRI
analysis. The timings of stimuli presentation were the same
for all subjects, but the speed with which successive ques-
tions were asked depended on how fast individual subjects
responded.
In line with institutional requirements in force at the time of
the experiments, participants were volunteers and were not
provided with any financial or other compensation.
Experiment 1
Thirty-nine subjects (19 females; mean age 35.5 years, range
18–60) read six stories presented visually, with the text broken
down into a series of 4–5 screens which participants viewed se-
quentially. All participants were healthy with no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders. After viewing each story,
participants were presented sequentially with 20 True/False
statements in random order. Reaction times and response ac-
curacy were recorded. Only reaction times to correct responses
are analysed.
Experiment 2
For the fMRI experiment itself, 17 subjects (mean age 2262.9
years, 9 females) were presented with five of the stories seen by
subjects in Experiment 1, following the design in Figure 1. All
participants were healthy and right handed with no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Although participants
were located within the MRI scanner throughout this experi-
ment, scans were only collected while they answered the True/
False questions. Note that for this experiment only questions at
levels 2–4 are used so as to ensure that the task is well within
the competences of normal adults who have an average compe-
tence at fifth order. Visual stimuli were presented on a projector
screen viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil above
the participant’s head. The text of each story was broken into
4–5 separate screens, as in Experiment 1. Participants also heard
each story being read through MRI compatible headphones
while viewing the text (1 min per story). After presentation of
each story, subjects viewed 20 True/False statements relating to
that story randomly intermixed with five null events (which
comprised fixation alone, and were included to provide a base-
line for the fMRI). Each statement was shown for a random dur-
ation between 7 and 11 seconds (based on the reaction time
data from the pilot experiment, see ESM section B). After each
statement, ‘T F DK’ [true, false, don’t know] was displayed on
the screen for 1.5 s as a cue to respond with the appropriate fin-
ger. The order from left to right of these cues was randomised
with respect to the questions. There was a gap of 2–5 s (mean
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3 s) blank screen between questions to provide jitter. In total,
each session (the time during which the participants were being
scanned) was 304 s long. Stories were presented in random
order. Prior to scanning, but whilst already in the scanner, sub-
jects read a practice story and answered ten questions using
this same paradigm to ensure that they understood the task.
Subject performance
Performance was calculated as percentage of correct responses
in the task (don’t know answers being classed as incorrect) on
questions at each order of intentionality or equivalent factual
memory. Although both intentionality and factual memory per-
formance differed significantly from a normal distribution in this
sample (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with Lillefors Significance
Correction: intentionality, P¼ 0.01; factual, P¼ 0.058; N¼ 51 in
both cases), we used ANOVA for statistical analysis (i) because
ANOVA is robust to departures from normality and (ii) to main-
tain consistency with the other analyses.
MRI scanning
T2-weighted echo planar images (EPI) with BOLD (blood-oxy-
gen-level-dependent) contrast were acquired using a special-
ized sequence which minimized signal dropout in the medial
temporal lobe (Deichmann et al., 2003). We used the following
scanning parameters to achieve whole brain coverage: 50
oblique axial slices at a 20 degree tilt in the anterior-posterior
axis, TR of 3 s, slice thickness of 2 mm (40% gap), TE of 30 ms, in
plane resolution was 3  3 mm. Data were collected in five
separate sessions (runs). Each run lasted 303 s, giving 101 vol-
umes. High resolution anatomical whole brain images were ob-
tained using a T1-weighted 3D-gradient-echo pulse sequence,
with the following parameters: (T1 190, TR 7.92 s, TE 2.48 ms,
FOV 224  256, matrix 256  256  256 pixels, flip angle 16),
acquired in sagittal plane.
fMRI analysis
Functional MRI images were analysed using the statistical para-
metric mapping (SPM2) software package (Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm). After the first two volumes of each session were dis-
carded to allow for T1 equilibration effects images were cor-
rected for head motion by realigning with the first image of the
first session and spatially normalised to an EPI template corres-
ponding to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain.
Normalised images were smoothed using a Gaussian Kernel
size with a full width at half-maximum (FWHM) of 8 mm.
To characterise functional responses, data were examined
using a two-level random effects analysis. At the first level, the
event-related design matrix contained all five of the experimen-
tal sessions (one for each story). The design matrix included
four primary regressors for each of these sessions: presentation
time (mentalising), presentation time (factual), response time (mental-
ising) and response time (factual) with both the response time
regressors having three parametric regressors each: button
pressed, accuracy and level. The four primary regressors were
measured in seconds, the parametric regressors each had three
options: button pressed (2, 4, 8), accuracy (true, false, don’t know)
and order (2nd, 3rd, 4th). Parameter estimates reflecting the height
of the hemodynamic response function for each regressor were
calculated at each voxel. Contrast images relating to specific
combinations of correctly classified items were calculated.
These included (i) mentalising, (ii) mentalising parametric
modulation, (iii) factual and (iv) factual parametric modulation.
Next, the contrast images resulting from our first-level ana-
lysis were entered into two separate second level design
matrixes in order to conduct two one-way ANOVAs. The first
design matrix, containing the contrast images for mentalising
and factual questions was used to conduct contrast 1 which
examined the responses to the mentalising component of
our task while controlling for memory (mentalising> factual).
The second design matrix, containing contrast images from
the parametric modulation of mentalising and factual, was
used to conduct contrasts 2 which compared parametric modu-
lation of mentalising and factual processing (parametric
mentalising>parametric factual). For completeness, we also
isolated areas associated with parametric modulation of men-
talising (contrast 3) and factual memory (contrast 4) in isolation.
In order to determine areas that were common to contrast 1
and contrast 2, both contrasts were plotted on the same brain in
xjView and common areas (regions of overlap) were extracted.
Statistical thresholding of the second-level activation maps
associated with these contrasts was an uncorrected threshold
of P< 0.001 in combination with a minimal cluster extent of 38
voxels. This yields a whole-brain alpha of P< 0.05, determined
using a Monte-Carlo Simulation with 1000 iterations, using a
function implemented in Matlab. Thresholded data were ren-
dered onto the MNI canonical brain for visualisation (P< 0.001,
k> 38). Areas which were parametrically modulated by mental-
ising but not factual and which also responded significantly
more to the mentalising task than the factual task
(mentalising> factual) were determined by plotting both results
on the same brain.
Data
The data for the reaction time experiments can be found in the
ESM [S1 Experiments 1þ 2 Reaction time experiment data]. The
neuroimaging data can be sourced at: 10.15127/1.269726
Ethics
The specific study designs were approved by the respective
Ethics Committees at Manchester and Liverpool Universities.
Fig. 1. The basic design for Experiments 1 and 2.
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Subjects gave written informed consent on arriving at the imag-
ing facilities.
Results
We evaluate first the reaction time data from Experiments
1 and 2 to determine whether mentalising questions were more
demanding (indexed as time taken to respond on correctly an-
swered questions) than pure factual recall questions, and how
this difference related to order of complexity. We then evaluate
the functional results of the imaging experiment to determine
whether there are any neurophysiological correlates.
Reaction time tasks
Experiment 1 was the reaction time experiment, intended, first,
to determine whether mentalising tasks take longer (i.e. are
harder) to process than the factual memory tasks and, second,
to ascertain whether this difference was amplified at higher lev-
els of intentionality. Mean accuracy across the five question lev-
els (levels 2–6) was 82.5% 6 1.1 se for mentalising tasks and
76.8% 6 1.1 se for factual tasks. The two types of task did not
differ in the accuracy of responses: controlling for individual
differences between subjects with question type and level as
fixed factors there was, as might be expected, a significant ef-
fect of level (ANOVA: F4,380 ¼ 36.6, P< 0.001, g2 ¼ 0.215) but not of
question type (mentalising vs factual: F1,380 ¼ 0.05, P¼ 0.816, g2 ¼
0.000), with a significant interaction (F4,380 ¼ 18.64, P< 0.001,
g2 ¼ 0.164). In the case of reaction times for correctly answered
questions only, by contrast, there was a significant difference
between the mentalising and factual questions, and a signifi-
cant effect due to level (Figure 2, meanmentalising ¼ 67336 228.6
se msecs vs meanfactual¼50026 143.7 se msecs; ANOVA, ques-
tion type, F1,379 ¼ 103.8, P< 0.001, g2 ¼ 0.215; level, F4,379 ¼ 134.7,
P< 0.001, g2 ¼ 0.584), with a significant interaction (F4,379 ¼ 14.7,
P< 0.001, g2 ¼ 0.134).
Even though those who get many questions wrong have
shorter reaction times on both types of question (probably be-
cause they are guessing), reaction times vary significantly
across answer categories only for mentalising questions
(ANOVA with number of correct questions as independent vari-
able: factual questions: F8,186 ¼ 1.38, P¼ 0.210; mentalising ques-
tions: F8,186 ¼ 3.00, P¼ 0.003), while the variances do not differ
significantly across categories in either case (Levene’s test for
homogeneity of variances: factual questions: F8,186 ¼ 0.62,
P¼ 0.759; mentalising questions: F8,186 ¼ 1.18, P¼ 0.315) (Figure
3). More importantly, performance on mentalising questions
was always slower than performance on factual questions even
when matched for the frequency of correct responses, no mat-
ter how many questions participants got wrong.
RT data are also available from the fMRI study (Experiment
2) itself. Although the constraints of the imaging design make
the results difficult to interpret, we nonetheless present them
here for completeness. Mean accuracy across the three question
levels in the fMRI experiment was 78.7% 6 2.2 se for mentalising
tasks and 79.9% 6 1.0 se for factual tasks (F1,94 ¼ 0.21, P¼ 0.650).
The mean rate of ‘don’t know’ responses was 10.3612.8%,
(10.76 14.2% mentalising and 9.9611.4% memory). A 3(level) 
2 (task) ANOVA on performance accuracy revealed a significant
effect of level (F2,90 ¼ 9.4, P< 0.001) but not of question type
(mentalising vs factual: F1,90 ¼ 0.2, P¼ 0.621), with no interaction
effect (F2,90 ¼ 1.3, P¼ 0.177). Although we have reaction time
data for this experiment, the experimental protocol was de-
signed to remove effects due to difficulty (only mentalising lev-
els 2–4 were tested, and participants prepared their response for
5–7 s while the statement was being presented prior to being
cued for a response). Reaction times were slightly faster for fac-
tual questions (1588.56 37.5 se ms for mentalising vs
1586.36 25.0 se ms for factual questions). The fact that there
were no main effects (level: F2,90 ¼ 0.4, P¼ 0.647, g2 ¼ 0.005; ques-
tion type: F1,90 ¼ 0.0, P¼ 0.988, g2 < 0.001) and no interaction
(F2,90 ¼ 0.3, P¼ 0.707) in these over-prepared reaction times isn’t
really meaningful. A fairer representation of conditions in this
experiment is, perhaps, provided by the pilot experiment, since
this was run with the same design but as a reaction time task in
order to parameterise timings for the imaging design. Although
the sample size was small (N¼ 8 only), the results (see
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: Mean reaction times of subjects when correctly answering
questions at each level on mentalising (solid symbols) or factual (open symbols)
recall (N¼39 subjects). Error bars are6 1 SEM.
Fig. 3. Mean (6SE) for reaction time (in ms) as a function of the proportion of
questions correctly answered at any given mentalising or factual level, for men-
talising (solid symbols) vs factual (unfilled symbols). Data from Experiment 1.
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Supplementary Data and Figure S1) are consistent with those in
Figure 2.
Taking the three samples together yields a significantly
consistent trend in the same direction (Fisher’s meta-analysis:
v2 ¼ 25.3, df¼ 2  3¼ 6, P¼ 0.0003), confirming a consistent
underlying pattern.
fMRI results
To explore the physiological implications, we carried out an fMRI
experiment using the same paradigm as the behavioural experi-
ment, except that, in order to ensure that the stimuli were well
within the cognitive abilities of all participants, we included only
intentionality levels 2–4 so as to be well within the natural range
for adults. To determine which brain areas were involved in the
mentalising task, we first pooled all intentionality levels and sub-
tracted activations associated with the factual questions from
those associated with the mentalising questions (contrast 1: men-
talising all> factual all). This revealed robust responses in a num-
ber of regions which have been previously associated with theory
of mind, including left TPJ and left dMPFC (Figure 4A). A full list of
results at P< 0.05, whole brain corrected, is given in Table 1.
To isolate regions which were more strongly activated for
more difficult mentalising tasks, we examined the parametric
regressors to identify those regions in which responses were
significantly modulated by intentionality level. We isolated re-
gions which were more strongly parametrically modulated for
mentalising than for factual memory (contrast 4: parametric
mentalising>parametric factual). This revealed strong re-
sponses in the left insula, left posterior STS, left temporal pole,
and right cerebellar hemisphere (Figure 4B; Table 1B for results
at P< 0.05, whole brain corrected). Note that these effects are
parametric functions of level, clearly demonstrating that more
demanding intentionality tasks are correlated with proportion-
ately stronger responses in these areas than is the case for
memory for the facts of the story. There were no significant re-
sponses for the inverse contrast (parametric factual>paramet-
ric mentalising). For completeness, we also isolated areas that
were parametrically modulated for factual memory (contrast 3)
and those that were more strongly parametrically modulated
for mentalising (contrast 4). Results are reported in Table 1.
In order to determine the extent to which these parametrically
modulated responses overlapped with general responses to inten-
tionality level (contrast 1), we plotted both sets of results on the
same brain. This showed overlap in all four areas where paramet-
rically modulated responses to intentionality had been identified,
although overlap in insula involved just one voxel (Figure 4C; see
Table 1B for results at P< 0.05, whole brain corrected) (contrast 1).
Discussion
Although mentalising questions did not differ from factual ques-
tions in terms of the subject’s ability to arrive at the correct an-
swer, in both of the reaction time experiments (Experiment 1 and
the pilot for Experiment 2), the mentalising questions at any
given level of complexity required more cognitive processing to
Fig. 4. Experiment 2: fMRI results showing (A) a broad pattern of response to the contrast intentionality>memory, (B) a more circumscribed response to the parametric
modulation of difficulty levels in the intentionality vs factual memory tasks, and (C) the results from A (in yellow) and B (in red) plotted together. All responses shown
are significant at P<0.05 whole-brain corrected, as specified in the methods section.
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achieve this. More importantly, there was a parametric effect of
question level, with mentalising questions becoming progres-
sively more taxing than factual memory questions as their order
increased. This was not true of reaction times in the fMRI experi-
ment (Experiment 2) itself, as participants were allowed to over-
prepare and it is questionable as to what these results actually
tell us; nonetheless, overall across the three sets of experimental
data, the results were in the same direction. Note that, in
Experiment 1, reaction times for the factual recall task seemed to
become asymptotic after level 4, but continued to rise for the
mentalising tasks (Figure 2). (We cannot tell if this also happened
in the two datasets from Experiment 2 as only levels 2–4 were
considered in this case.) This would seem to reinforce the claim
that mentalising recall tasks become progressively more de-
manding than factual recall tasks that lacked a mentalising com-
ponent: factual recall tasks do not necessarily continue to
Table 1. Summary of significant fMRI responses from Experiment 2 at P< 0.001, k> 38, which provides a whole brain corrected probability of
P< 0.05
A) Mentalising > Factual memory (not parametric)
k equivZ x,y,z (mm)
874 6.9 28 -84 42 Posterior cerebellum
1352 7.6 52 58 26 TPJ (superior temporal gyrus/supramarginal gyrus)
2093 5.5 8 50 34 Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
461 5.2 46 8 30 TP (middle temporal gyrus)
302 5.1 46 8 44 TP (middle temporal gyrus)
221 4.6 18 42 76 Postcentral gyrus
606 4.4 36 0 10 Insula/inferior frontal gyrus
120 4.4 22 74 42 Posterior cerebellum
488 4.3 44 4 10 Insula/inferior frontal gyrus
391 4.2 16 52 28 Precuneus
149 4.1 2 18 34 Middle cingulate gyrus
96 3.9 36 20 26 TP (superior temporal gyrus)
46 3.8 12 16 2 Caudate
83 3.7 0 22 26 Anterior cingulate
120 3.6 48 32 8 Middle temporal gyrus
41 3.6 20 8 8 Putamen
B) Mentalising parametric > Factual memory parametric
39 5.7 34 12 16 Insula
43 4.1 46 2 30 temporal pole (middle temporal gyrus)
64 5.8 56 48 34 Temporo-parietal junction (supramarginal gyrus)
C) Common areas in A and B
38 – 26 80 44 Posterior cerebellar lobe (declive and tuber)
32 – 50 4 32 Temporal pole (middle temporal gyrus)
39 – 52 52 34 Temporo-parietal junction (supramarginal gyrus)
1 – 40 10 12 Insula
D) Mentalising parametric
1990 5.3 46 16 20 Insula
166 4.4 32 32 4 Hippocampus
55 4.2 66 10 8 Temporal pole (superior temporal gyrus)
139 4.2 6 22 80 Postcentral gyrus/precentral gyrus
46 4 26 38 6 Orbitofrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus)
53 3.9 50 36 58 Postcentral gyrus
277 3.9 24 66 26 Posterior cerebellum
C) Factual memory parametric
4003 5.4 22 80 0 Occipetal lobe
318 4.9 22 36 8 Orbitofrontal cortex (middle frontal gyrus)
259 4.4 40 38 66 Postcentral gyrus
73 4.4 12 66 50 Cerebellum
187 4.3 52 66 10 Middle occipetal gyrus
360 4.3 66 12 10 Supramarginal gyrus
250 4.2 46 66 28 Cerebellar hemisphere
74 4.1 44 72 28 Cerebellar hemisphere
73 3.9 34 2 16 Insula
52 3.7 28 66 4 Middle occipetal gyrus
63 3.5 2 56 26 Cerebellar vermis
46 3.5 18 68 26 Mid cerebellum o
44 3.5 34 64 24 Cerebellar hemisphere
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increase in difficulty, but mentalising tasks do. These results
were supported by the fMRI experiment, which suggested that,
despite the reaction time results, mentalising tasks recruit more
neural response than simple factual recall tasks, and do so dis-
proportionately as intentionality level increases compared to
non-mentalising tasks matched for factual complexity.
In addition, our results confirm (i) that mentalising tasks are
cognitively more demanding than factual tasks and, more im-
portantly, (ii) that there is a significant parametric effect in the
brain regions involved as a function of the intentionality level at
which subjects are required to work (higher order tasks require
the recruitment of disproportionately more neural effort com-
pared to equivalent non-mentalising tasks).
Although fMRI studies have consistently implicated a network
of regions in the temporal lobe and prefrontal cortex in theory of
mind reasoning (Carrington and Bailey 2009; van Overwalle, 2009),
the claim that mentalising itself is especially cognitively demand-
ing has never actually been tested, despite the fact that it is a core
assumption of both the social brain hypothesis (Byrne and
Whiten, 1988; Dunbar, 1998) and the social (or communicative)
complexity hypothesis (Freeberg et al., 2012). The social brain hy-
pothesis argues that the kinds of social decisions necessitated by
the more complex social arrangements found in species like an-
thropoid primates are more cognitively demanding, and that this
is reflected in the need for larger brains (Byrne and Whiten, 1988),
and hence a correlation between frontal lobe volume, in particu-
lar, and social group size in primates (Dunbar and Shultz, 2007).
Although the precise relationship between cognitive pro-
cessing demand and brain volume (or neural density) remains
undetermined, an agent based model has suggested that, as
implied by the social complexity hypothesis, the more complex
social decisions required to support larger social groups are
‘cognitively’ more demanding (as indexed by CPU processing
time) (David-Barrett and Dunbar, 2013). In this respect, the re-
sults reported in this paper suggest one way in which the social
brain hypothesis might have been instantiated: the greater cog-
nitive processing required for more complex decision making is
achieved by increasing the amount of neural tissue available for
this. Our results do not, of course, provide direct evidence for
this, but they are at least consistent with such a conclusion. As
an hypothesis, we might suggest that the additional cognitive
demand arises from the need to model other individuals’ men-
tal states in a virtual world rather than simply relying on direct
physical cues (or simple association learning).
Most of the regions identified as disproportionately impli-
cated in mentalising by our imaging study are those already
known to be part of the ‘theory of mind network’. Our results in-
dicate that this is a quantitative effect rather than just a qualita-
tive one: activity in these regions increases disproportionately
with mentalising level. In addition, however, our analyses also
suggest that other brain regions not normally associated with
mentalising may also play a role. The cerebellum was one such
identified by the contrast analysis (Figure 4B). Although not typ-
ically thought of as critical for social cognition, the cerebellum
has been linked to both autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Ito,
2008) and basic theory of mind processing (Brothers and Ring,
1992). The cerebellar role in cognitive tasks of this type is not
well understood, but the cerebellum is widely thought to play a
role in managing integration across different cognitive proc-
esses (Kolb and Wishaw, 1996; Ramnani, 2006; Ito, 2008;
Wiestler et al., 2011; Koziol et al., 2012). This being so, it might
prove to be especially important when managing several differ-
ent mind states simultaneously, especially when it is necessary
to keep these differentiated as in mentalising tasks of the kind
considered here. Keeping track of one other mindstate (in add-
ition to one’s own) may not be so challenging, but managing
three others may be and so may demand cerebellar input.
It is important to note that our baseline measure is the num-
ber of factual propositions in each vignette, not the embedded-
ness of these factual elements. Embeddedness is, by definition, a
property of mentalising, and the present design does not dissoci-
ate these two components. For present purposes, however, we
are less concerned with the difference between mentalising and
embeddedness than with the difference between mentalising
(in effect, the number of mentalised facts in a story, embedded or
otherwise across individual minds) and simple factual memory
(the number of non-mentalised facts in the same story). Indeed,
grammatical embeddedness may be one way in which high order
mentalising is scaffolded. Nonetheless, other experiments have
suggested that mentalising may be more limiting of individ-
uals’ abilities to process complex sentences than grammatical
embeddeness per se (Oesch and Dunbar, 2017).
An alternative possible source of confound is that mentalis-
ing and factual questions might differ in the ease with which a
participant can identify the proposition that makes a sentence
false. In all our questions, each false statement had only one
false element (clause), and all the rest were true. It could there-
fore be that a false mentalising question requires one to read
right to the end of the sentence in order to know that it was
false, whereas a false factual question can be identified as soon
as one encounters the false proposition. If this were true, then
the variance on factual questions should be greater than that
on mentalising questions because the false statement could be
in any position from first to last clause in the question, whereas
mentalising questions would require one to read to the end.
Since the variances are in fact very small and do not differ be-
tween the two kinds of questions (Figure 2; Supplementary
Figure S1), this cannot explain our results. An alternative possi-
bility might be that false mentalising questions can be identi-
fied as soon as one comes across the false proposition, whereas
one would have to read the whole of a factual question to be
sure that no facts were incorrect. However, if this was true, then
we would expect exactly the opposite results to those we ob-
tained (i.e. mentalising questions would be processed faster).
There are, perhaps, several reasons why these potential
sources of confound are unlikely to explain the results. One is
that the error variance does not vary systematically with ques-
tion level, or between question types (Figure 2). Secondly, half
the questions were true questions and half false, but the pos-
ition effect can only apply to false questions; subjects would
have to read to the end for all true questions of both types to
make sure that the false proposition was not in the last clause.
Hence, the bias would have to massively increase the variance
in response time on false questions in order to compensate for
the lack of effect on the true questions. Finally, and perhaps,
more importantly, a plot of reaction time as a function of per-
formance does not suggest that questions become differentially
faster to process the more accurately they are answered (Figure
3). This suggests that the differences we observe are most likely
due to the added cognitive demands of mentalising.
The functional imaging results demonstrate that, as subjects
need to simultaneously judge more mental states and the rela-
tionships between the individuals involved, they draw on pro-
gressively greater neural resources, sometimes involving a
larger number of brain regions, especially in those brain regions
within the frontal and temporal lobes that are known to be
associated with theory of mind. This need to recruit additional
neural power might help to explain why neocortex (and
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particularly frontal lobe) volume correlates both with social
group size across primates (Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar and Shultz,
2007) and with personal social network size in humans (Lewis
et al., 2011; Kanai et al., 2012; Powell et al., 2012, 2014) and ma-
caques (Sallet et al., 2011). However, the question of whether
cognitive demand is reflected in neural volume remains to be
determined.
In summary, these findings suggest that social cognitive pro-
cessing (mentalising) is unusually computationally demanding,
thereby confirming of a central assumption of the social brain
hypothesis. This may have particular relevance to the kinds of
cognition that are peculiar to anthropoid primates (Passingham
and Wise 2011) and which may, in quantitative terms at least,
be especially unique for humans.
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